Physical Security Is By Design

In part one of this “Protecting your Communication Center,” series we addressed the importance of cybersecurity, including types of threats, safety measures, individual impact, and support and resources for agencies.

Similar principles apply when considering the physical safety of your comm. center and the protection of the emergency personnel within. Emergency comm. centers must be prepared for both intentional threats and unintentional hazards that could disrupt the critical lifeline they provide to their community. Structural design, emergency planning, and security practices provide the protection that makes all the difference. Preparation by design begins before there is even a door to step inside.

Importance of physical security

As emergency dispatchers, our hope is to focus solely on the safety of our callers and responders while coordinating emergency services. However, ignoring the potential for emergencies directly affecting the comm. center is a dangerous oversight.

Natural disasters can strike anywhere, affecting our agencies’ capability of providing service to the public. In fact, an emergency comm. center is at greater risk because it can be a target of civil conflict and violence.

This is especially true if the emergency comm. center is connected to a police station, government building, or other public space that may be notable. Even if disturbances do not directly hit the center, damage to resources, networks, and infrastructure can cripple basic functions.

The following incidents exemplify challenges that can occur when disaster impacts a comm. center:

• Civil unrest/arson: In 2020, the George Floyd incident in Minneapolis–Saint Paul (Minnesota, USA) led to widespread civil unrest across the Twin Cities. Demonstrators overran and burned the Minneapolis Police Department’s Third Precinct station among extensive looting, destruction, and arson across the area.¹ While 911 communication centers were not directly damaged, impacted police facilities, increased call volumes, and unsafe conditions significantly strained emergency response coordination and reduced responders’ capabilities.²

• Bombing: Early on Christmas morning in 2020, 911 calls reported the sound of gunshots in downtown Nashville, Tennessee (USA). When officers arrived, they located a recreational vehicle (RV) parked in front of a commercial building where all telephone lines converge for switching and connections. The RV was sounding a pre-recorded message for residents to evacuate the area. It then exploded, resulting in fire and flooding within the building and severe damage to the network hub. This caused widespread outages of cellphone, telephone, and internet services across Middle Tennessee and neighboring states. The disruption also affected 170 public safety answer points (PSAPs) as far away as Kentucky and Alabama, with outages lasting several days.³

• Flooding: In 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused catastrophic flooding across southeastern Louisiana (USA), severely damaging critical communications infrastructure. In St. Tammany Parish and surrounding areas, multiple 911 call centers experienced outages, with some systems rendered completely inoperable. Confusion over call routing, disruptions, and system overloads significantly hindered response during a time of extreme need, leading thousands of emergency calls to be misdirected or unanswered.⁴

• Wildfire: In 2018, a campfire in Butte County, California (USA), rapidly spread into a catastrophic wildfire that destroyed critical communications infrastructure, including cellular towers. As thousands of calls were placed for evacuation, rescue, and fire reporting, emergency services experienced overwhelming demand, and communication failures significantly hindered coordination and response efforts.⁵

Even with protections and plans in place, these realities show how comm. centers are impacted by unexpected events. As with all emergencies, there are elements within our control and those beyond it. If 911 centers prioritize emergency preparation to protect and preserve ourselves and our functionality, we can control the narrative instead of being paralyzed by a predicament.

Risk assessment is not about predicting or preventing the effects of a disaster; it’s about planning and prioritizing an action plan forward. To begin, consider the following three-part model:

• Analyze your threats—What threats are more likely to impact your area? (e.g., flood zones, fault lines, nearby forests or wildlands, surrounding infrastructures, or community conflicts)

• Consider points of vulnerability—How is your center exposed? (e.g., points of access, structural stability, or lack of emergency resources)

• Weigh the potential consequences—What could be the impact? (e.g., evacuation plans, service disruptions, extended shifts, emergency stays or lockdowns)

Ty Wooten, IAED^™ Director of Governmental Affairs, applied similar principles in his former employment as Director of Communications at Indianapolis International Airport (Indiana, USA).

“Agencies need to apply the principles of both redundancy and resiliency as they face the full gambit of what can—and will—happen in the face of an emergency,” he said. “This means adding backups, diversifying systems [including plans for handling or rerouting 911 calls], and planning for potential failures.”

Protective structural design

Physical security begins with the blueprints, including the building’s location in relation to its surroundings and public access. Just as with government facilities or airports, the physical offset of a center is an important starting point in planning.

“You can apply the same principle to the building’s layout,” Wooten said. “If the lobby leads directly to the comm. center floor—without hallways, doors, or other barriers—this is less secure. I think of physical security as building concentric rings like a tree. There are several surrounding layers, but the most secure portion should be the 911 floor.”

Built-in security

Starting from the outside, the first layer of defense should be fencing, a security guard or access control, and bollards (concrete spheres) or other barriers that prevent a vehicle from driving into the building. Some agencies even have a gate that can be raised or lowered to grant access.

Several documents outline the specific details of architectural requirements for an emergency comm. center. For instance, National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) 1225 “Standard for Emergency Services Communications” addresses communication center survivability through requirements for facility construction, exposure hazard mitigation, security, fire protection, power redundancy, and remote backup facilities. These documents can help ensure that your planning incorporates details of each phase of development, laying the groundwork for future development.⁶

For instance, if you identify an area where you plan to put a security gate in the future, you can build a conduit now to feed a wire in later and avoid the hassle of digging out space later, saving time and resources.

Each center must also determine how to handle access points, which raises finer detailed questions. Will a security guard staff the lobby to ensure only secured visitors are allowed entrance? Are security badges enough to limit access to higher security areas such as server rooms? Should alarms be installed on doors to alert supervisors? Who is given access to control logs of personnel coming and going from certain areas?

Obviously, cameras are a crucial security component. Placing them at all access points as surveillance is basic, but as technology advances, cameras can now be programmed to follow vehicles driving up or to help identify visitors in the lobby. Though it’s controversial, having cameras on the inside of the dispatch floor may be valuable—not to continually monitor employees, but to pull up video footage in case of an incident.

Accessibility and functionality

Practicality and sustainability must be part of a secure, purposeful emergency comm. center design. Though the intention is to limit access, be sure to consider what will work for your center. Employees may choose to use food delivery at times, and it may become more vital in an emergency or extended event that could span several days.

At DuPage Public Safety Communications (DU-COMM), a large consolidated 911 dispatch center in Illinois (USA), the staff often orders an oversized pizza to serve 20-25 people from their favorite shop. Thinking ahead in the design of their building, they provided their architect with an empty pizza box to incorporate a slot to slide in a pizza without having to allow anyone to come in.

“You want your center to be secure but also accessible as needed,” Wooten said. “It’s a matter of secure functionality. If measures become burdensome and overwhelming, employees may decide to circumvent and override policy, just leaving a door propped open, which defeats the whole purpose of these protections.”

Building materials

The structural elements of an emergency comm. center building must be constructed to consider all potential threats in your area. In some locations, it may be necessary to invest in seismic upgrades to withstand powerful earthquakes. In others, a foundation is made of 18” reinforced concrete (pre-cast and set with a crane) with built-in embankments to redirect (and withstand) an F5 tornado—as they normally move in a northeast direction. Roof hardening can be used to prevent penetration and water intrusion, and door frames can be reinforced to resist forced entry.

Bulletproof glass in the lobby is an added security measure, but if the glass begins at desk level, builders and designers need a plan to reinforce the space below. Otherwise, a shot aimed below the glass level can still reach victims through unprotected drywall.

Other aspects include grounding and lightning rods to protect tall radio towers, metal enclosures to block electromagnetic interference (EMI) and protect sensitive electronics, raised flooring to prevent equipment damage from flooding or leaks, and fire-resistant materials used to prevent or contain flames.

These are just a few examples of how building design and specialized materials are essential in providing multi-faceted protection.

“The key is not to specialize your focus on one aspect of security done to the extreme,” Wooten said. “Instead, try to create as many overlapping layers as possible. If one area has a vulnerability that fails, the center and its employees are still covered.”

Emergency planning and sustainability

Planning for an emergency requires preparing for an interruption or scarcity of available resources. Most centers create an individualized Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) that includes procedures for disasters, facility outages, and staffing contingencies.⁷

To maintain operations, these plans should designate backup facilities, alternate call handling locations, and redundant systems. The National Emergency Number Association (NENA) offers models for PSAP Disaster and Contingency Plans that can be adapted for each center locally, emphasizing planning to address facility, personnel, and equipment survivability in disasters. This includes hazard analysis, mutual aid agreements, and continuity components.⁸

In cases of extreme or extended events, we must evaluate the emergency comm. center’s ability to provide for basic human needs including food (preparation areas), potable water, sleeping quarters (bunker rooms), shower stations, laundering facilities, and backup generators.

Maintenance considerations

Initially obtaining potable water and food does not ensure that they remain usable. Emergency management teams are responsible for regularly updating emergency plans and resources. Over time, have rations expired? Have plastics leeched into bottled water? Beyond checking physical supplies, you must conduct drills, test backup systems, and review staff rotation and contingency plans as annual checks. You don’t want to discover the need for maintenance when these resources are being heavily relied upon.

Some of these preparations can come from unique solutions. For instance, the Charleston County Consolidated Emergency Communication Center (South Carolina, USA) captures rainwater the center can use to flush toilets when water is scarce, preserving valuable potable water for drinking purposes.

Power is another huge consideration as it sustains 911 operations and server equipment (critical infrastructure) and network systems. As a more critical risk to staff, power loss could impact security (turning off lights, alarms, surveillance systems, and door locks) and interfere with HVAC systems that regulate temperature, humidity, and ventilation. These off-grid emergencies are far more than an inconvenience. They are disarming and disabling.

“Having a backup generator is essential,” Wooten said. “But adding alternate power stations is a greater safeguard, building in redundancies and overlapping protection.”

Conclusion

In a field where emergencies are our daily bread and butter, we can’t be caught off guard when they happen to us. As we prioritize operability, sustainability, and survivability in our emergency comm. centers, planning makes all the difference.

Wooten shares the following ways to appeal to decision-makers to make the safety and security of your center a higher priority:

1. Identify a potential vulnerability at your center, outline solutions, and make the request. Keep documentation of specific proposals. Even if first rejected, there may be a future need to revisit the issue.

2. Look for county, state, and federal grants from supporting agencies such as FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). Find ways to collaborate with your emergency operations center (EOC) and your emergency management agencies.  

In case of emergency, you’ll be glad you did.

Sources

1. “Staples Man Charged In Minneapolis Police Third Precinct Arson.” United States’ Attorney’s Office—District of Minnesota. 2020; June 17. https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/staples-man-charged-minneapolis-police-third-precinct-arson (accessed May 22, 2026).

2. Kolls, J. “Report: Minneapolis backup 911 center burned in Third Precinct fire, interference with emergency communication.” KSTP.com ABC 5 Eyewitness News. 2021; Feb. 1. https://kstp.com/kstp-news/top-news/report-minneapolis-backup-911-center-burned-in-third-precinct-fire-interference-with-emergency-communication/ (accessed May 22, 2026).

3. “Communications Dependencies Case Study: Nashville ‘Christmas Day’ Bombing.” SafeCom. NCSWIC. 2022; June. https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/video/22_0602_ecd_dependencies_2020-nashville-bombing_508C.pdf (accessed March 18, 2026).

4. Connolly, C. “Thousands of Katrina 911 Calls Went Astray.” The Washington Post. 2005; Nov. 7. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/11/08/thousands-of-katrina-911-calls-went-astray/5dc46197-98cd-4bea-a3d6-7bfa12802430/ (accessed March 18, 2026).

5. St. John, P., and Serna, J. “California’s Camp Fire Highlights Major Failings in Phone-Based Alerts.” Los Angeles Times. 2018; Dec. 3. https://www.govtech.com/gov-experience/californias-camp-fire-highlights-major-failings-in-phone-based-alerts.html (accessed March 23, 2026).

6. “NFPA 1225: Standard for Emergency Services Communications.” National Fire Protection Association. 2022. https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/nfpa-1225-standard-development/1225 (accessed March 23, 2026).

7. “Disaster Planning Docs.” 911.gov. https://www.911.gov/docs-and-tools/?category=disaster-planning#sort=date (accessed March 23, 2026).

8. “NENA Standards and Documents.” NENA. https://www.nena.org/page/standards (accessed March 23, 2026).